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THE USE OF CIVIL LIABILITY TO AID CRIME VICTIMS
Our legal system is beginning to take note of the
problems encountered by victims of crimes, whose
rights until now have been largely overlooked!
The general focus of this concern has been the
provision of adequate financial compensation for
crime victims2 through the use of insurance, resti-
tution, state-funded compensation programs or
civil actions.3 Crime insurance and court-ordered
restitution have been considered insubstantial in
many cases, and also have been criticized because
of the extent of their dependence on the individual
discretion of insurance adjusters and judges." Al-
though nearly one-third of the states have enacted
victim compensation programs,5 such programs
also have been criticized as ineffective because of
their restrictions on recoveries for victims of violent
crimes.' Civil actions to compensate crime victims
1 See Denenberg, Compensation for the Victims of Crime:
Justice for the Victim as Well as the Criminal, 1970 INs. L.J.
628; Comment, Compensation For Victims Of Violent Crimes,
26 KAN. L. REv. 227 (1978).2 See Inbau, Forward to Carrington, Victim's Rights Lit-
igation: a Wave of the Future?, 11 U. RICH. L. REv. 447
(1977).
3 See Lamborn, Remedies for the Victims of Crime, 43 S.
CAL. L. REv. 22 (1970). In this work, the author reviews
and evaluates the remedies currently available to those
disabled by criminal conduct.
4 See Harland, Compensating the Victims of Crime, 14 CRIM.
L. BULL. 203 (1978). Professor Harland points out that
there is a need for the imaginative use of restitution.
5 See ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.67.010-18.67.180 (1974 &
Supp. 1977); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 13959-74 (West Cum.
Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE Trr. 11, §§ 9001-17 (Cum. Supp.
1976); HAw. REV. STAT. §§351-1 to 351-70 (1968 &
Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 71-84 (Smith-
Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, §§ 1-
17 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1977); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 258A, §§ 1-7 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 299B.01-299B.16 (West Cum. Supp. 1977);
NEv. Rev. STAT. §§ 217.010-217.350 (1977); NJ. STAT.
ANN. §§52:4B-1 to 52:4B-21 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-
78); N.Y. Exec. LAw art. 22, §§ 620-35 (McKinney 1972
& Supp. 1972-77); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-13-01 to 65-
13-20 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REv. CODE Ann. §§ 2743.51-
2743.72 (Page Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE Ann. §§ 23-3501
to 23-3517 (Cum. Supp. 1976); WASH. REv. CODE Ann.
§§ 7.68.101-7.68.910 (Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. Ann.
§§ 949.01-949.18 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
" Most of these programs fail to compensate the victim
for pain and suffering and only provide relief for ,eco-
nomic loss resulting from violence such as medical bills
also have been generally ignored because of the
difficulty of obtaining civil recovery from the per-
petrator of the criminal act.
7
However, several recent cases indicate that vic-
tims of crime have been successful in suits against
common carriers for the criminal actions of third
parties.8 These suits have been aided by the increas-
ing tendency of courts to find defendant carriers in
violation of a duty to prevent crime against passen-
gers and others. Similarly, victims also have found
success in suits against other entities for the crimi-
nal acts of third parties, if a special legal relation-
ship between the victim and the potential defend-
ant is successfully pleaded. Such a special relation-
ship giving rise to a duty to protect another from
a criminal attack by a third person may exist, for
example, in innkeeper-guest, landowner-invitee
and custodian-ward situations.? Yet, the major
source of litigation in the area of third person
criminal attacks, and hence the prime focus of this
article, still appears to arise from common carrier-
passenger situations.
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Kenny v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transpor-
tation Authority,'0 imposed civil liability on a com-
mon carrier for failing to protect adequately its
passenger against criminal violence. In Kenny, a
woman who was raped in a transit station sued the
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Au-
and loss of wages. See Lamborn, note 3 supra; McAdam,
Emerging Issue: An Analysis Of Victim Compensation, 8 UB.
L. 346 (1976).
7 "All victims of criminal violence have a remedy in
tort, but the problems associated with civil recovery are
legion. First, the suspect must be apprehended. If the
suspect has no assets, the victim's civil recovery is com-
pletely frustrated." McAdam, supra note 6, at 347-48.
8 See Kenny v. SEPTA, 581 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1978);
McCoy v. CTA, 69 I11. 2d 280, 371 N.E.2d 625 (1977).
9 See Totten v. More Oakland Residential Housing,
Inc., 63 Cal. App. 3d 538, 134 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1976). See
also Carrington, supra note 2, at 459-67, for other potential
applications of such civil liability. It should be noted that
such civil suits allow a victim to seek damages for pain
and suffering which are not generally available under the
average state compensation program.
10581 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1978).
VICTIMS' USE OF CIVIL LIABILITY
thority" (hereinafter SEPTA) and the City of Phil-
adelphia. The evidence showed that the plaintiff
was attacked by another patron while awaiting the
arrival of a train at an inadequately lighted station
platform. The SEPTA employee on duty allegedly
paid insufficient attention to platform conditions,1
2
although SEPTA had previously acknowledged the
existence of a crime problem on its transit system.
At trial, the jury concluded that the transit
system had knowledge of the dangerous condition
of the platform, and had negligently failed to
provide adequate protection against such danger.
This negligence was found to have been the prox-
imate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The jury also
decided that the City of Philadelphia was not
liable."3 Nevertheless, the district court 4 entered
judgment notwithstanding verdict in favor of
SEPTA, finding that SEPTA had no reason to
anticipate the criminal conduct of the assailant at
the particular station involved.'5 The district court
also rejected the plaintiff's alternative argument
that the lack of adequate lighting and an adequate
system of security devices, such as closed circuit
TV coverage of the platform or telephone and
warning devices, were the proximate cause of the
assault.
On appeal, the Third Circuit reinstated the jury
verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The court held that
in view of SEPTA's knowledge that crime had
been increasing on the transit system, the possibil-
ity of such an assault on the station platform should
"SEPTA, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Author-
ity, is an entity created by the Pennsylvania Legislature
to provide mass transit in the greater Philadelphia area.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66 §§ 2002-03 (Purdon Cum. Supp.
1978-79).
12 The carrier's attendant who had been in the cashier's
booth testified that he knew nothing of the attack and
had not heard the plaintiff's screams. He admitted that
he had a portable radio playing in the booth, but said
that the radio was permitted by his employer. A tele-
phone in the booth was connected with dispatches and
security units but was not used that evening until after
police had come to investigate the incident. 581 F.2d at
353.
13 Id. at 354. Apparently, the jury did not agree with
the plaintiff's argument that the Philadelphia Police
Department, who were relied on by the transit system to
provide protection for its patrons, were negligent in
failing to protect the station platform or in responding to
her cries for help. The jury awarded damages of $18,000
against SEPTA alone. Id. at 353.
14 Id. Federal jurisdiction in this case was based upon
diversity of citizenship. The federal court applied Penn-
sylvania law.
15 Id. at 354.
have been foreseeable. The court then applied
Section 344 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts"
in finding that SEPTA had a duty to protect the
plaintiff from foreseeable criminal acts. Under Sec-
tion 344, a landholder is liable to its business
invitees for physical harm caused by the intentional
acts of third persons and the failure of the land-
holder reasonably to protect the invitee from fore-
seeable harm. 7 The court held that this duty was
violated by SEPTA when it failed to provide ade-
quate lighting at its transit station and when its
employee failed to hear the plaintiff's screams and
call the police.
Furthermore, the court claimed that the district
court had erroneously narrowed the scope of
SEPTA's potential liability by emphasizing the
probability of the specific offense occurring at the
particular location involved. The appellate court
instead held that the duty to protect its patrons is -
to be determined, in such cases, by "whether the
authority could have reasonably expected criminal
activity from anyone at its station."'8 This statement
of the scope of the carrier's duty may significantly
increase the chances of proving that a carrier has
been negligent in failing to provide adequate safe-
'r Section 344 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
(1965) states that:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public
for entry for his business purposes is subject to
liability to members of the public while they are
upon the land for such a purpose, for physical harm
caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally
harmful acts of third persons or animals, and by the
failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care
to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are
likely to be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visi-
tors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect them
against it.
See also Comment E to Section 344, which as pointed out
by the Kenney Court, states that:
it may not be enough for the servants of [a] public
utility to give a warning, which might be sufficient
if it were merely a possessor holding its land open
to the public for its private business purposes. The
utility may then be required to take additional steps
to control the conduct of the third person, or other-
wise to protect the patron against it.
Section 344 of the RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS
(1965) had been cited with approval in Pennsylvania. See
Moran v. Valley Forge Drive-In Theater, Inc., 431 Pa.
432, 246 A.2d 875 (1968) (a patron recovered from a
theater for injuries received when rowdy teenagers ex-
ploded a firecracker near him).
17Section 344, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
(1965).
is 581 F.2d at 354 (emphasis added).
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guards against criminal activities. The court's em-
phasis on the evidence which showed a high crime
rate on Philadelphia's mass transit system also
indicates that this standard may prove to be an
effective tool for the plaintiff who is criminally
assaulted in an area with a large volume of prior
crime.'
9
The Kenny court has not been the only court to
hold a carrier liable for the foreseeable criminal
acts of non-related parties. Civil liability was also
imposed on a common carrier for the criminal act
of a third party by the Illinois Supreme Court in
McCoy v. Chicago Transit Authority.20 In that case, the
plaintiff was injured when he was assaulted by a
fellow passenger while riding a Chicago elevated
train. Although the plaintiff obtained ajury verdict
in his favor, the state appellate court held that
verdict to be against the manifest weight of the
evidence. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court
reinstated the trial court's verdict holding the com-
mon carrier liable, under Illinois law, for a breach
of its duty to prevent the commission of a foresee-
able criminal act against a passenger.2' The court
looked to the case facts and noted that a Chicago
Transit Authority (CTA) conductor had been
aware of the presence of three loud and trouble-
some men on his train. The conductor had seen
that these men were bothering the plaintiff but
had failed to take any action. Later, it was these
men who assaulted the plaintiff. Centering on the
conductor's failure to take preventive action, as
well as on the fact that this particular CTA transit
line was in an area having a high incidence of on-
board crime,2 2 the court held that the verdict of
liability must be sustained.
9 See Comment F to Section 344 of the RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF ToRTs (1965) which points out that a pos-
sessor of land may:
know or have reason to know, from past experience,
that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of
third persons in general which is likely to endanger
the safety of the visitor, even though he has no
reason to expect it on the part of any particular
individual. If the place or character of his business,
or his past experience, is such that he should reason-
ably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the
part of third persons, either generally or at some
particular time, he may be under a duty to take
precautions against it, and to provide a reasonably
sufficient number of servants to afford a reasonable
protection.
See also 13 CJ.S. Carriers § 678 (1955) which notes that
the duty to exercise care for a passenger's safety may vary
according to time, place and circumstances.
2069 Ill. 2d 280, 371 N.E.2d 625 (1977).
21id. at 289, 371 N.E.2d at 629.
2Id. at 289, 371 N.E.2d at 627.
Prior Illinois cases23 had indicated that two ele-
ments were necessary to support a finding of com-
mon carrier liability: (1) that the carrier knew or
should have known that one of its passengers may
be injured through the occurrence of a criminal act
and (2) that the carrier had ample opportunity to
take preventive measures to protect all passengers,
but failed to do so. The court in McCoy found that
these two elements were present in the plaintiff's
evidence. The court reasoned that the CTA motor-
man should have been aware of the potential mis-
conduct of the three boisterous passengers on the
train.24 The conduct of these passengers, who later
assaulted the plaintiff, -together with the existing
high level of crime on the train's route, made the
criminal injury of the plaintiff foreseeable. Fur-
thermore, the court noted that the conductor could
have prevented the assault through radio commu-
nication with the motorman, who in turn could
have established radio contact with CTA head-
quarters to obtain help.
2
5
Both Kenny and McCoy avoid the recurring tort
law problem of determining foreseeability by fo-
cusing on the occurence of prior crimes on the
respective transit lines. This is significant, espe-
cially in urban areas where transit crime is becom-
ing commonplace. The use of evidence of prior
assaults on persons using the defendant carrier's
facilities is crucial in establishing the defendant's
negligent breach of its duty to police its platform.26
23The court reviewed three principal Illinois cases:
Watson v. CTA, 52 I1. 2d 503, 288 N.E.2d 476 (1972);
Letsos v. Chicago Transit Authority, 47 11. 2d 437, 265
N.E.2d 650 (1970); Blackwell v. Fernandez, 324 I1. App.
597, 59 N.E.2d 342 (1945).
In Letsos, the Illinois Supreme Court held that under
the circumstances, the incident which caused the plain-
tiffs injury occurred so quickly and unexpectedly that
the driver of the carrier, acting with the highest degree of
care consistent with the safe operation of the bus, could
not have averted it. In Watson, the transit authority was
held liable upon a showing that the driver drove the bus
for several blocks while the plaintiff was struggling with
his assailant for a gun. The plaintiff in Watson was then
subsequently shot when the driver purposefully opened
the bus doors to throw out the struggling pair.
In Blackwell, an Illinois Appellate Court affirmed a
jury verdict finding the carrier liable. The facts showed
that the streetcar conducter allowed an intoxicated and
quarrelsome passenger aboard who subsequently knifed
the plaintiff in the case.
The conductor had admitted in prior deposition
testimony that he had thought that these passengers were
"apparently ... bent on mischief." 69 Il1. 2d at 284, 371
N.E.2d at 627.
25Id. at 282, 371 N.E.2d at 626.
'See Miller v. CTA, 78 Ill. App. 2d 375, 223 N.E.2d
323 (1966). But see Sue v. CTA, 279 F.2d 416 (7th Cir.
19791
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This evidence may also lay the basis for the estab-
lishment of the carrier's willful or gross negligence
in failing to fulfill its duty to provide safe passage
for its passengers. Such negligence can result in the
recovery of exemplary or punitive damages.
2 7
It should also be noted that Kenny and McCoy
both reinstated jury verdicts which had been over-
turned by trial court judges. This could indicate a
trend toward greaterjury discretion in determining
the scope of a common carrier's liability. Thus
liability may depend upon the jury's prediction of
the likelihood of criminal injury to the plaintiff
together with the potential of the defendant carrier
to prevent the criminal conduct.
Other recent cases which have dealt with the
imposition of civil liability on common carriers for
the criminal acts of third parties have also empha-
sized the concept of foreseeability. The court, in
one prominent case, MacPherson v. Tamiami Trail
Tours,28 held that a bus driver had not exercised a
sufficient degree of care when he asked the plaintiff
to move to the rear of the bus. The court stressed
the fact that the bus driver knew that the plaintiff,
who was black, had been threatened by some
belligerent white passengers seated at the rear of
the bus, so that the driver was sufficiently aware of
the potential danger of a racially motivated attack
on the plaintiff. Because of this knowledge, the
court held the defendant carrier liable for the
injuries which the plaintiff sustained during the
ensuing criminal assault.29
In Smith v. West Suburban Transit Lines,30 a bus
passenger sued a bus company to recover damages
for personal injuries sustained when he was as-
saulted by a motorist who had become angry at
the bus's obstruction of traffic. The state appellate
court reversed a directed verdict in favor of the bus
company and ruled that the evidence permitted a
conclusion that the motorist's attack upon the
plaintiff could have been anticipated and pre-
vented by the bus driver, since the motorist had
threatened the bus driver and all of his passengers
before the attack. As the court noted, "[t]he carrier
must exercise the care required to protect the pas-
senger from violence even by a stranger.... The
1960) "Prior occurrence evidence must be such as would
establish that the carrier had notice of danger to its
passengers at the place of the accident." Id. at 418 (em-
phasis added).
27 13 CJ.S. Cariers § 674 (1955).
2 383 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1967).
'The court also held that it was the duty of a bus
company to acquaint a passenger with any threat of
danger known to it.
so 27 11. App. 3d 220, 326 N.E.2d 449 (1975).
general rule is clear that, from whatever source the
danger may arise, if it be known, care must be
exercised to protect the passenger from that dan-
ger.
31
The scope of a common carrier's duty to protect
its passengers from the criminal acts of third parties
may extend beyond the vehicle to the carrier's
parking lot. In Watson v. Adirondack Trailways,32 a
New York appellate court affirmed a judgment
against a common carrier, where the plaintiff was
assaulted by an intoxicated passenger in the de-
fendant's parking lot while walking to the bus
terminal.33
Recent cases have also held that a common
carrier has a duty to protect its passengers from the
foreseeable criminal acts of a mob. In Campo v.
Georges 4 for instance, a Louisiana appellate court
held that a bus driver must be aware of the possi-
bility of gang violence when a group of rowdy
people enter a bus. The court found that in such a
situation a bus driver must "take such actions as
may be practicable under the circumstances to
prevent assault from being committed or to inter-
fere with its execution. ' ' as Furthermore, the court
seemed to ease the plaintiffs proof requirements
by holding that "[tihe mere showing of injury to a
fare-paying passenger, and [the passenger's] failure
to reach his destination safely, establishes a prima
fade case of negligence.
' 'se
A Pennsylvania appellate court, in addition, has
31 Id. at 223, 326 N.E.2d at 451 (quoting Neering V.
Illinois Central R.R., 383 Ill. 366, 378, 50 N.E.2d 497,
502 (1943)).
3 359 N.Y.S.2d 912, 45 A.2d 504 (1974)..
33 It should be noted, however, that a person may lose
passenger status if he leaves the premises of the carrier.
See Ortiz v. Greyhound Corp., 275 F.2d 770 (4th Cir.
1960).
The determination of passenger status does not turn
solely on the payment of a fare. See Suarez v. Trans-
World Airlines, Inc., 498 F.2d 612 (7th Cir.1974).
The matters to be considered in determining the
status of passenger are: (1) place (a place under the
control of the carrier and provided for the use of
persons who are about to enter carrier's convey-
ance); (2) time (a reasonable time before the time
to enter the conveyance); (3) intention (a genuine
intention to take passage upon carrier's convey-
ance); (4) control (a submission to the directions,
express or implied, of the carrier); and (5) knowl-
edge (a notice to the carrier either that the person
is actually prepared to take passage or that persons
awaiting passage may reasonably be expected at the
time and place).
Katamay v. CTA, 53 Ill. 2d 27, 32, 289 N.E.2d 623, 626
(1972).
3' 347 So. 2d 324 (La. App. 1977).




advanced what may be the broadest duty to protect
passengers from criminal mob action. In Mangini v.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authoriy,37 a
bus driver opened a door of a trolley when a mob
of boys were hurling objects against the trolley.
The driver did not even attempt to get out of his
seat to exert his influence when this mob boarded
the trolley and attacked his passengers. In the
resulting suit for damages, the court found that the
driver had negligently failed to uphold his affirm-
ative duty to protect, as best he could, his passen-
gers from the criminal acts of third persons. The
court maintained that a carrier must use every
means at its command to protect its passengers and
restrain, and if necessary remove, the .disorderly
parties. "If necessary, the employees of a carrier
may enlist the assistance of willing passengers,
police, or other authorities to quell a
disturbance."' 8 The court noted that a failure to
use these measures may lead to the imposition of
liability on the carrier if the carrier knew of violent
human behavior which gave rise to a reasonable
apprehension of injury, prior to the time a passen-
ger is in fact injured.
Despite the recent trend in cases holding com-
mon carriers liable, the carriers have escaped lia-
bility in some instances. Those cases which have
absolved a common carrier of any liability for the
criminal acts of third persons against its passengers
have focused on two factors: the non-foreseeability
of the criminal act and the inability of the carrier
to have prevented the crime through reasonable
means. For example, in Morris v. Chicago Transit
Authority9 an Illinois appellate court relieved a
carrier of liability because it was unable to reason-
ably foresee and avoid an injury to its passenger
resulting from a brick being hurled into one of its
buses. Similarly, in Martin v. Erie-Lackawanna Rail-
road,"° a federal district court applying Ohio law,
reversed ajudgment for a victim-passenger because
the evidence failed to show that the carrier should
have known that the plaintiff would be a victim of
an abortive purse-snatching attempt that would
result in her sustaining bodily injuries.
Two recent cases in Louisiana, Higgins v. New
Orleans Public Service, Inc.4' and Orr v. New Orleans
Public Service, Inc.,42 also reflect the need to show
344 A.2d 621 (Pa. Super ct. 1975).
I Id. at 623.
9 28 Ill. App. 3d 183, 328 N.E.2d 208 (1975).
4 388 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1968).
4' 347 So. 2d 944 (La. App. 1977).
42349 So. 2d 417 (La. App. 1977).
The carrier is not obliged by its contract to
provide armed guards, or even simply to hire only
foreseeability before the court will impose liability
on common carriers for the criminal acts of third
parties. In Higgins, a 67-year-old bus passenger was
assaulted by a group of boys. The court held that
the bus driver could not have anticipated this
assault and therefore was not negligent. Further-
more, the court narrowly defined the duty of a
carrier by noting that the driver did not have any
affirmative obligation to intervene in the assault
and had fulfilled his duty by summoning the po-
lice.4 In Orr, the court, as in Higgins, reversed a
judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the evi-
dence failed to show a reasonable foreseeability of
the violence which was inflicted upon the plaintiff
by a gang of youths. The court stated that the
assault was so brief that the carrier could not have
reasonably prevented it.
One recent case, Hanback v. Seaboard Coastline
Railroad," indicates that when a carrier's employee
fails to respond adequately to a passenger's cries
for help, the carrier may be held secondarily liable
for the aggravation of injuries resulting from a
criminal act even though the carrier was not pri-
marily responsible for the occurrence of the act. In
Hanback, the plaintiff was sexually assaulted on an
Amtrak passenger train. The trial court found that
the defendant carrier did not violate its duty to
protect adequately the victim from the occurence
of an unpredictable criminal act. However, the
court held that the victim could recover for the
injuries and damages suffered when an Amtrak
employee failed to respond adequately to her
screams.
In sum, the trend to allow passenger victims to
recover from carriers for third party criminal acts
represents a response to the need to provide ade-
quate remedies for persons who have been victim-
ized. However, the courts are reluctant to allow
crime victims to use such civil liability in the
absence of special legal relationships.4 It should
burly wrestlers or boxers as drivers; otherwise it
could not hire slightly built persons to drive its
buses. Therefore the carrier cannot have the obli-
gation to have its driver physically intervene in a
beating. Thus even if a driver happens to be very
strong, if he personally has some moral obligation
arising out of his humanity to aid a weak person
being beaten by a stronger one, the carrier does not
have the obligation to intervene, but only to sum-
mon the police as speedily as possible.
347 So. 2d at 946.
4396 F. Supp. 80 (D.S.C. 1975).
4 See Totten v. More Oakland Residential Housing,
Inc., 63 Cal. App. 3d 538, 134 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1977);
Pippin v. CHA, 58 Il. App. 3d 1029, 374 N.E.2d 1055
(1978).
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nevertheless be emphasized that such legal rela-
tionships arise with great frequency in our social
system. These relationships may effectively be used
to provide a compensatory civil remedy for victims
of criminal acts." The rising rate of crime on
premises which are open to the public for business
purposes is a factor which may be used by a court
to facilitate a finding that the occurrence of a
criminal act on those premises was foreseeable.
4See generally Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d
334 (1976); Carrington, supra note 2.
Such foreseeability can then in turn lead to the
creation of a concurrent duty to protect one's busi-
ness visitors from criminal actions.
If the plaintiff-victim can successfully allege the
presence of a special legal relationship, as in the
common carrier-passenger cases, he may be able to
recover damages for his criminal injuries from a
third party. The plaintiff need only show that the
crime which resulted in his injury was foreseeable
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MANIFEST NECESSITY RULE
INTRODUCTION
In its last term, the Supreme Court opened yet
another chapter in the interpretation of the "man-
ifest necessity" rule, which permits a retrial of a
criminal defendant following a mistrial if the facts
of the first trial showed a manifest necessity for the
mistrial declaration. The Court's decision in Arizona
v. Washington' signaled a retreat from the Warren
Court's attempt to limit the application of the rule
through strict appellate review of the trial judge's
determination. The Court held that a trial judge's
determination of manifest necessity based on his
assessment of jury bias merits "special respect."
The Court also refused to impose a requirement of
special hearings and explicit findings as a matter
of constitutional law.
In 1824, the Court had held in United States v.
Perez2 that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
bar retrial of a defendant where there was manifest
necessity for a mistrial declaration in the first trial.
As the Court said in Perez, a mistrial declaration is
proper where "taking all the circumstances into
consideration there is a manifest necessity for the
act or the ends of public justice would otherwise be
defeated." 3 In Perez, a retrial was allowed when the
first trial ended in a hung jury.
While the manifest necessity rule itself has re-
mained unquestioned, there has been much judi-
cial debate in the last twenty years as to the degree
of necessity to be required and the role of appellate
review in such cases. The older view, to which
Arizona is to some extent a return, maintained that
appellate courts were so ill-suited to review the
decision of a trial judge who witnessed the events
in question and could best assess their impact, that
the trial judge's opinion deserved special deference.
Courts adhering to this view seldom attempted to
impose stricter standards of necessity on the trial
judge. In 1963, however, the Supreme Court began
to encourage a more active appellate scrutiny de-
signed to limit the operation of the rule to cases of
the most "imperious necessity." To assess Arizona's
impact, therefore, it is necessary to examine the
pre-1963 law and the changes that the Warren
I 434 U. S. 497 (1978). See also, 69 J. Crim. L. & C. 563
(1978).
2 23 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
3 Id. at 580.
Court sought to effect in it. The focus of this note
will then shift to the Arizona case and its initial
reception in the federal courts of appeals.
BACKGROUND
Gori v. United States4 is illustrative of the Supreme
Court's pre-1963 attitude towards appellate review
of mistrial determinations. There, a mistrial was
declared in the defendant's first trial and his plea
of former jeopardy was rejected at his second trial.
On appeal, the Court affirmed the defendant's
conviction. The record in Gori does not clearly
reveal the reason for a mistrial in the first case, but
the Court noted that "[a]pparently the trial judge
inferred that the prosecuting attorney's line of
questioning presaged inquiry calculated to inform
the jury of other crimes by the accused, and took
action to forestall it." 5 Even though there was no
record clearly showing why the mistrial was de-
clared, the Court rejected Gori's plea of former
jeopardy and cited the special respect due the trial
judge's determination. As the Court noted:
Where, for reasons deemed compelling by the trial
judge, who is best situated intelligently to make
such a decision, the ends of substantial justice can-
not be attained without discontinuing the trial, a
mistrial may be declared without the defendant's
consent and even over his objection, and he may be
retried consistently with the Fifth Amendment. It is
also clear that "[t]his Court has long favored the
rule of discretion in the trial judge to declare a
mistrial and to require another panel to try the
defendant if the ends ofjustice will best be served."
... . and that we have consistently declined to
scrutinize with sharp surveillance the exercise of
that discretion.
6
Justice Douglas, writing in dissent, disagreed
with the Court's analysis in language foreshadow-
ing his opinion in Downum v. United States.7 Douglas
would have limited the application of the Perez rule
through a strict standard of appellate scrutiny
designed to develop rules and categories not sub-
jecting the accused to the exercise of uncontrolled
judicial discretion. According to Douglas, "Once a
4 367 U. S. 364 (1961).
5 id. at 366.6 Id. at 368 (citations omitted).
7372 U.S. 734 (1963).
Vol. 70. No. I
rinted in U.S.A.
MANIFEST NECESSITY RULE
jury has been impaneled and sworn, jeopardy at-
taches and a subsequent prosecution is barred,
even if a mistrial is ordered, absent a showing of
imperious necessity."s
The Cor holding thus represents the ultimate in
deference given to trial judge discretion. Both the
court of appeals and the Supreme Court majori-
ties were in doubt as to the reason for the mistrial.
Nonetheless, they were willing to allow a retrial,
apparently based on the mere fact that the trial
judge had declared a mistrial. In addition, the
Supreme Court was influenced in its decision by
the fact that the mistrial was apparently declared
for the defendant's benefit and that defense counsel
had been silent when the mistrial was declared.
This indicates that perhaps less deference would be
due the trial court where it acts in the prosecution's
interest or over defense objection.
The first case in which the Supreme Court re-
versed a trial court's determination was Downum v.
United States.9 There, the trial court had granted a
mistrial after the jury had been sworn over defend-
ant Downum's objection. The mistrial was declared
because a key government witness could not be
found. Two days later, when the missing witness
had been found, a second jury was sworn and a
new trial begun. Downum's plea of former jeop-
ardy was rejected and his subsequent conviction
was affirmed by the appellate court.10
Upon consideration of this mistrial, the Supreme
Court acknowledged the governing Perez standard,
but sought to limit its application to only the "most
striking circumstances." With Justice Douglas ac-
quiring a majority's adherence to his views and
writing the opinion, the Court noted that:
At times the valued right of a defendant to have his
trial completed by the particular tribunal sum-
moned to sit in judgment on him may be subordi-
nated to the public interest-when there is an im-
perious necessity to do so .... But those extreme cases
do not mark the limits of the guarantee. The discre-
tion to discharge the jury before it has reached a
8 367 U.S. at 371 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis
supplied.) The term "imperious necessity" is somewhat
confusing as is the tendency to phrase the debate in terms
of degree of necessity. By "imperious necessity" Justice
Douglas mean to give the term its literal meaning. By
confining the operation of the Perez rule to such cases,
justice Douglas hoped to limit judicial discretion in cases
where this important fifth amendment right is involved.
9 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
Io See Downum v. United States, 300 F.2d 137 (5th
Cir. 1962). The lower court opinion here displays exactly
the same attitude as Cori.
verdict is to be exercised "only in very extraordinary
and striking circumstances.""
The Court went on to note that it would resolve
any doubt "in favor of the liberty of the citizen,
rather than exercise what would be an unlimited,
uncertain, and arbitrary judicial discretion."' 2
While announcing no new principle, Downum
signaled a startling change in judicial attitude
towards the weight to be given trial court findings
of "manifest necessity." As the opinion indicated,
manifest necessity was to mean "imperious neces-
sity," and the accused was to have all doubts
resolved in his favor.
Justice Clark, writing in dissent, would have
applied the more traditional "abuse of discretion"
standard characterized by Gori. Identifying several
factors in favor of the trial judge's position, Clark
noted that the mistrial was by far the most conven-
ient course of action. Holding the jury for an
indefinite and potentially lengthy period would
not only have disrupted the court's calendar but
might in itself have also been reversible error.'3 Nor
did Clark think that the two-day suspension had
resulted in any real harm to Downum of the sort
the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to pre-
vent.
14
The course of opinions during the fifteen years
after Downum reveals a new interventionist attitude
towards trial judge determinations of manifest ne-
cessity. However, Arizona v. Washington15 decided in
the 1977-78 term, signals a return to something
resembling the Con" Court's deference to the trial
court. Defendant Washington's first trial ended in
mistrial when it was discovered that the prosecu-
tion had suppressed exculpatory evidence. A mis-
trial was declared in the second trial, over defense
objection, based on defense counsel's improper ref-
erence to the termination of the first trial. There
was no separate hearing, no express finding of
manifest necessity, and no explicit consideration of
alternatives to the mistrial. At his third trial, Wash-
ington unsuccessfully pleaded formerjeopardy and
the Arizona courts affirmed his subsequent convic-
tion.
Washington then sought a federal writ of habeas
corpus charging that his conviction had been se-
cured in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
" 372 U.S. at 736.
12Id. at 738.
13 Id. at 742. Administrative convenience was the prin-
cipal factor in favor of the court's decision.
' Id. at 742-44.
"s 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
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The district court granted the writ and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 6 The United
States Supreme Court reversed and discharged the
writ. justice Stevens, writing for the majority, first
noted the traditional high regard for the "valued
right" not to be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense and acknowledged that the prosecution has
a heavy burden when it attempts to show that
there is manifest necessity to subordinate this right
to the ends of public justice1 7 Nonetheless, Stevens
lightened the heavy burden in three significant
ways.
Foremost, Justice Stevens backed away from the
"imperious necessity" standard of Downum. He rec-
ognized the existence of degrees of necessity, but
only required "a 'high degree' before concluding
that a mistrial is appropriate."' 8 And, Stevens'
"high degree" of necessity was clearly not the sort
of literal necessity previously required by Justice
Douglas in Downum. Having established this test,
Stevens then frankly acknowledged that, under the
facts of this case, there was no "high degree" of
necessity and that there were viable alternatives to
the declaration of a mistrial. According to Stevens:
[T]he District Court was quite correct in believing
that some trial judges might have proceeded with
trial after giving the jury appropriate cautionary
instructions. In a strict, literal sense, the mistrial
was not "necessary." Nevertheless, the overriding
interest in the evenhanded administration ofjustice
requires that we accord the highest degree of respect
to the trial judge's evaluation of the likelihood that
the impartiality of one or more jurors may have
been affected by the improper comment19
The Court ameliorated the prosecutor's burden
in a second important respect. For the first time
since Gori, the Court stressed the deference due the
trial judge's determination. There is some incon-
sistency in stressing both the heavy burden of
persuasion born by the prosecutor and the defer-
ence due the trial judge. To the extent that the
appellate court refused to scrutinize strictly the
trial judge's determination, the state has an espe-
cially easy time before an appellate tribunal. In
Arizona, the Court seemed willing to give almost
presumptive weight to the trial judge's determina-
tion.
Nonetheless, there is an important difference
between the Court's new approach and that used
l6 Arizona v. Washington, 546 F.2d. 829 (9th Cir.
1977).
17 See 434 U.S. at 503-05.
'6 Id. at 506.
'9Id. at 511.
in the pre-1963 cases. The Court in Arizona was
unwilling to retreat entirely from "imperious ne-
cessity" in all categories of cases. Read literally,
Arizona states only that "special respect" is due to
the trial judge where the mistrial declaration was
based on juror bias. In other categories of cases, the
strict appellate review of the Warren Court's
Downwn case may still be appropriate. The Court
expressly adopted a "sliding scale" approach to
determine the appropriateness of appellate review
of mistrial declarations. At one end of the scale are
cases of hung juries where the trial judge's opinion
is virtually conclusive. At the other end of the
spectrum are cases where collusion between judge
and prosecutor or other forms of prosecutorial
overreaching are involved. This category includes
mistrials declared because of the unavailability of
prosecution evidence, or cases where there is "rea-
son to believe that the prosecutor is using the
superior resources of the State to harrass or to
achieve a tactical advantage over the accused." 2
The third regard in which the prosecution's
heavy burden is ameliorated is largely procedural.
The Arizona Court simply noted that where the
record adequately disclosed the reason for the mis-
trial, special hearings and explicit findings of fact,, ,,21
are not "constitutionally mandated.
While repudiating the Downum interventionist
attitude in several important respects, Arizona is by
no means a complete return to the laissez-faire Gori
standard. It is true that the case lowers the level of
necessity and allows judges greater leeway in their
mistrial orders. In the lower scrutiny level it is
perhaps accurate to say that the Court contem-
plates a return to pre-Downum attitudes. Yet in the
small category of cases entitled to the strictest
scrutiny, interventionism of the Downwn type seems
still to be the rule. But aside from the examples
mentioned, the Court has given very little guidance
on classifying cases. Since the examples given are
all cases where the prosecution has obtained some
advantage from the mistrial declaration, this may
be the key. It is suggested that mistrials resulting
from defense misconduct, as Arizona, innocent cir-
cumstances, or mistrials clearly declared for the
benefit of the accused will be placed in the lower
scrutiny category.
LOWER COURT TREATMENT
There have been several appellate decisions ap-
plying the manifest necessity standard since Arizona
2 Id. at 508.21Id. at 517.
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was decided. Included within these cases are United
States v. Everss2 and United States v. Starling.2s One
would expect that the first inquiry in each of these
would be to determine the extent to which the
lower courts followed the Arizona formulation. In-
terestingly, neither of these cases adopted the slid-
ing scale approach of Arizona. Indeed, each case
displayed a marked judicial reluctance to abandon
the Downum-type intervention.
The first of these cases, United States v. Evers, was
decided less than a month after Arizona and the
court there simply ignored the new standard. In
Evers, a government witness made irrelevant re-
marks to the effect that the probable source of the
defendant's allegedly unreported income was em-
bezzled campaign donations. The district court,
after some discussion of alternatives, declared a
mistrial over defense counsel's objection. 24 The
* Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court, dismissing the indictment and finding that
the trial judge should have issued curative instruc-
tions instead. The court noted that the trial judge's
opinion is entitled to great weight and thus cited
Gori. However, it also recognized that:
Appellate review of decisions affecting rights so
fundamental as the right not to be twice placed in
jeopardy cannot be limited merely to ascertaining
whether the trial judge went through the ritual of
rejecting alternatives to mistrial .... IHere] defend-
ant waived his right to rely on the prejudicial
comment as a ground for reversal should he be
convicted. There thus was no interest to be pro-
tected by ordering a mistrial sua sponte over the
objections of both the defendant and the United
States.2
Evers represents precisely the type of case that
the Arizona Court believed required special defer-
ence to the trial judge's opinion. The mistrial order
rested on the trial judge's assessment of the effect
on the jury of prejudicial remarks. And, the appel-
late balancing between curative instructions and
mistrial orders undertaken by the appellate court,
is precisely what Arizona sought to avoid. In Arizona,
22 569 F.2d. 876 (5th Cir. 1978) (decided March 16,
1978).
23 571 F.2d. 934 (5th Cir. 1978) (decided April 21,
1978).
24 See 569 F.2d. at 878. Initially defense counsel had
moved for the mistrial but after consultation with his
client, the motion was withdrawn. Defense counsel ob-
jected to the government's mistrial motion. Apparently,
defense counsel believed an acquittal was likely had the
case gone to the jury.25 Id. at 87 1.
too, curative instructions respresented a viable and
perhaps favored option. Even so, the decision of
the trial judge there was upheld. The only possible
distinguishing factor in Evers is the extraordinary
lengths to which defense counsel went to avoid the
mistrial. His willingness to waive the remarks as a
ground of possible appeal meant that there was no
necessity at all from the standpoint of judicial
administrative efficiency. Nevertheless, the deter-
mination of whether or not a jury has been biased
belongs to the trial judge and the Fifth Circuit's
refusal to give his decision special weight runs
contrary to the Arizona mandate.
United States v. Starling in some respects disre-
garded Arizona even more blatantly than Evers.
Starling was another Fifth Circuit case decided
shortly after Evers and it is probably not insignifi-
cant that two of the three judges deciding Starling
also decided Evers.' 6 In the circumstances of Starling,
the defendant's trial found the jury "hopelessly
deadlocked," but still the trial judge sent them out
for further deliberation. Somewhat later, a note
from the foreman informed the judge that the
defendant had tried to talk to the jurors during a
recess, but the exact circumstances of the attempt
was not brought out. The judge asked the foreman
if any of the jurors had said that their judgment
had been affected by these attempts, and the fore-
man replied, "Yes." 27 Without further inquiry, the
trial judge declared a mistrial. While mentioning
the apparent deadlock, the trial judge based his
order primarily on his opinion that the jurors
appeared to "resent" the attempts at conversa-
tion.s
The appellate court considered both the jurors'
inability to agree and the possibility of juror bias,
and concluded that the record did not justify the
inferences that the trial judge drew. The court
claimed that the jury did not "expressly profess an
irreconcilable conflict as to the guilt or
innocence"2 of the accused, although the jury had
earlier reported itself "hopelessly deadlocked." On
the jury bias issue, the court refused to believe that
the trial judge could have legitimately referred bias
without a more detailed questioning of the jury.
Finally, the appellate court expressed strong dis-
approval of the trial judge's failure to consider
alternatives explicitly in the context of the double
jeopardy significance of his decision.
26 Tuttle, J., and Clark, J., were in the majority on
both panels.
, 571 F.2d. 934, 937.




Through its decision in Starling, the Fifth Circuit
again ignored Arizona in precisely the context to
which it was most clearly addressed. The Starling
court was eager to substitute its factual judgment
based solely on a cold record for that judgment of
the trial judge who had actually observed the
occurrence. It is difficult to see what "special re-
spect" this court paid the trial court's determina-
tion. There was certainly evidence in the factual
record of Starling which could have led a court
following the Arizona guidelines reasonably to con-
clude either that the jury was hung or that they
were improperly biased by the defendant's conver-
sational forays.
Unlike the court in Evers, the Starling court did
attempt to distinguish Arizona. The court stressed
the fact that the trial judge showed a "total lack of
awareness of the double jeopardy consequences of
the court's action or of the manifest necessity stan-
dard." Also, the court recognized that the trial
judge had not adequately balanced the accused's
"protected interest" in having one tribunal decide
his case.3° Under these facts, the court believed
that the reasons for appellate deference to the trial
court diminished "beyond the point of signifi-
cance." 31 The court's rationale appears to be that
the opinion of the trial judge is entitled to special
deference only when he has actually exercised an
informed discretion and has taken all of the rele-
vant factors into account. The court found support
for the position in footnote 28 of the Arizona opin-
ion. There, the Supreme Court remarked:
If the record reveals that the trial judge has failed
to exercise the "sound discretion" entrusted to him,
the reason for such deference [to his opinion] dis-
appears. Thus if the trial judge acts for reasons
completely unrelated to the trial problem which
Id. at 941.
31 d.
purports to be the basis for the mistrial ruling, close
appellate scrutiny is appropriate 2
The first sentence of the footnote apparently
supports the result in Starling. Yet, read in context
with the facts in Arizona and with the second
sentence in the note, the attempt to distinguish
Starling from Arizona becomes completely specious.
It will be recalled that the explicit weighing of
alternatives and thought about the double jeop-
ardy consequences of the order which Starling seems
to require, is not present in Arizona. The Arizona
Court had remarked that such explicitness is not
constitutionally mandated.3 Also, there was no
evidence in the Arizona circumstances that the trial
judge acted for reasons completely unrelated to the
purported ground of the mistrial declaration. In-
deed, his order clearly reveals the reasons for the
order. Absent some compelling reason to doubt the
trial judge's determination that the jurors had been
adversely affected by the remarks, the appellate
court ought simply to have accepted the trial
judge's determination.
CONCLUSION
The initial reaction to the Arizona opinion has
displayed a strong reluctance to curb the post-
Downum tendency to hyper-critical examination of
lower court manifest necessity determinations. The
sliding-scale approach which Arizona sought to
adopt thus has had no apparent effect in the
earliest opinions. It is to be hoped that whatever
their views on the wisdom of the decision, the
appellate courts will shortly bring their attitudes
into conformity with what ought to be binding
precedent.
32 434 U.S. at 510 n.28. (citation omitted).
3 Id at 517.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY
INTRODUCTION
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amend-
ment, although brief in length,1 has continually
provoked strong judicial disharmony2 and a pro-
digious amount of litigation.3 While the actual
language of the clause has remained unchanged
for almost 200 years, the United States Supreme
Court has "interpreted" that language in an amaz-
ing number of different ways.4 Perhaps the Su-
preme Court is not ready to abandon the doctrine
of stare decisis in double jeopardy cases;5 however,
three cases decided last term6 indicate that the
Court has no qualms about altering or overruling
even recent precedent.
Crist v. Bretz: FEDERAL RULE REGARDING
ATrACHMENT OF JEOPARDY is BINDING ON THE
STATES
The Court in Crist v. Bretz was presented with
the issue of whether the federal rule governing
attachment ofjeopardy in ajury trial7 was binding
on the states through the fourteenth amendment. 8
1"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeQpardy of life or limb." U.S.
CONsr. amend. V.
2 See, e.g., the 5-4 decision in United States v. Scott,
437 U.S. 82 (1978).
3 Last term there were no less than eight double jeop-
ardy cases decided by the Supreme Court. They include
Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct. 2699 (1978); United States v.
Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978); Sanabria v. United States, 437
U.S. 54 (1978); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978); Greene
v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978); Burks v. United States,
437 U.S. 1 (1978); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
315 (1978); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1976),
which was overruled only three terms after it was decided.
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
5 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978).
' Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) (6-3 decision au-
thored by Justice Stewart; Blackmun, J., concurred;
Burger, C.J., Powell, and Rehnquist, J.J., dissented),
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (8-0 decision
written by Chief Justice Burger); United States v. Scott,
437 U.S. 82 (1978) (5-4 decision written by Justice Rehn-
quist, with Brennan, White, Marshall, Stevens, J.J., dis-
senting).
7 In federal courts, jeopardy attaches when the jury is
sworn and empaneled. In nonjury federal trials, jeopardy
does not attach until the first witness is sworn. Serfass v.
United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1974).
8 "[T]he double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth
Amendment ... [applies] to the States through the Four-
The point at which jeopardy attaches is crucially
important because "only if that point has once
been reached does any subsequent prosecution of
the defendant bring the guarantee against double
jeopardy even potentially into play."9
The appellees in Bretz were brought to trial in a
Montana state court on various criminal charges.'
0
A jury had been empaneled and sworn following
a three-day selection process. However, before the
first witness had been sworn, the appellees attacked
the validity of the information which had been
filed against them. The court agreed that a typo-
graphical error had made a portion of the infor-
mation defective and dismissed that count. The
prosecution then asked the trial judge to dismiss
the entire information so that a new one could be
filed. This motion was granted by the judge. The
granting of a new trial by the judge was in con-
formity with Montana law, which did not place
the attachment of jeopardy until the first witness
had been sworn." After a second jury had been
empaneled and sworn, appellees were tried and
found guilty of the charge which had previously
been dismissed because of the defective original
information. -
At all points12 after the trial judge had allowed
teenth Amendment," and the same constitutional stan-
dards apply equally in federal and state courts. Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
9 437 U.S. at 32-33.
1o Appellees Cline and Bretz were charged with grand
larceny, obtaining money and property by false pretenses
and several counts of preparing or offering false evidence.
JIe at 29.
1 Mowr. REv. CODES ANN. § 95-1711(3)(d) (Supp
1977).
12 After a second jury had been selected and sworn,
appellees, claiming that the double jeopardy clzuses of
the United States and Montana constitutions had been
violated, moved to dismiss the new information. After
trial, appellees sought habeas corpus relief from the Mon-
tana Supreme Court, but it was denied. State ex. rel.
Bretz v. Sheriff of Lewis & Clark County, 539 P.2d 1191
(Mont. 1975). The appellees then brought a habeas
corpus proceeding in a federal district court again claim-
ing that their convictions had been unconstitutionally
obtained because the second trial had placed them in
double jeopardy. The federal court denied the petition.
Cunningham v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 430 (D.
Mont. 1975). The court upheld Montana's statute, which
attached jeopardy at the swearing of the first witness. In
the alternative, the court decided that even if jeopardy
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the prosecutor to file a new information, the ap-
pellees claimed that further prosecution of the
previously dismissed charges would violate their
fifth and fourteenth amendment guarantees
against being placed in double jeopardy. The fed-
eral district court denied the appellees' petition for
habeas corpus relief.'3 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, 4 stating that the federal rule
governing the time when jeopardy attaches (which
is when the jury is empaneled and sworn) "is a
constitutional requirement of the Fifth Amend-
ment which is binding on the states as well as the
federal government." 5 It further held that there
had been-no manifest necessity for the Montana
trial judge's dismissal of the defective count; there-
fore, a second prosecution of that count was not
permissible.
The State of Montana appealed only that por-
tion of the Ninth Circuit's opinion which held that
the states were required to follow the federal rule
concerning attachment ofjeopardy. Thus, the nar-
row problem before the Supreme Court in Bretz
was whether "the federal rule is an integral part of
the constitutional guarantee."16 If it were, then the
rule would be binding on Montana (and all of the
states) because the same double jeopardy consti-
tutional standards 'apply equally in federal and
state courts.
17
The federal rule that jeopardy attaches when a
jury is empaneled and sworn was first formulated
in Downum v. United States.' The reason for attach-
ing jeopardy at this point "lies in the need to
protect the interest of an accused in retaining a
chosen jury."' 9 The Bretz Court decided that this
interest-a defendant's valued right to have a trial
completed by a particular "tribunal-"is now
within the protection of the constitutional guar-
antee against double jeopardy." 20 It follows from
Benton v. Matyland,2' that if the federal rule is "at
the core" of the doublejeopardy clause, 2 the states
had attached, a second prosecution was justified, because
manifest necessity supported the first dismissal.
13 See text accompanying note 12 supra."
"Bretz v. Crist, 546 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1976).
'kd. at 1343.
18 437 U.S. at 32 (emphasis added).
7 
7 See note 8 supra.
8 372 U.S. 734 (1963). This point was not explicitly
stated in Downwn, but later cases have understood it to
be authority for the proposition that federal jeopardy




0 d. at 36.
2 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
22 The Court noted that if the attachment rule were
are not permitted to attach jeopardy at a later
point.23
Since one of the three major concerns which
have shaped the development of federal double
jeopardy law2 4 is the protection of a defendant's
right to continue with a chosen jury2 3 (a concern
which the federal rule reflects)2 6 the Court could
not hold that the federal double jeopardy rule "is
only at the periphery of double jeopardy con-
cerns."
27
With its explicit holding2 3 that the federal rule
is an integral part of the constitutional guarantee
against being placed in double jeopardy, the Bretz
Court invalidated all state statutes and decisions
which placed the attachment ofjeopardy at a time
later than the empaneling and swearing of the
jury.
Burks v. United States: REVERSAL BY AN APPELLATE
COURT SOLELY FOR LACK OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S VERDICT BARS RETRIAL OF
THAT ISSUE
The petitioner in Burks v. United States'a was tried
for an attempted bank robbery. His principal de-
fense was insanity. Before the case was submitted
to the jury, petitioner sought a judgment of ac-
quittal, which was denied by the trial judge. The
jury then found petitioner guilty as charged. Sub-
sequently, Burks filed a motion for a new trial,
alleging among other things that the evidence was
insufficient to support the verdict.
merely an arbitrary exercise of line-drawing, there would
be a good argument for attaching jeopardy when the
witness is sworn. Such a rule could apply both to jury
and non-jury trials and would recommend itself on the
basis of that consistency. 437 U.S. at 37.
23 There is no suggestion that jeopardy could not be
attached at an earlier point, if a state so chose.
2 The three main concerns which have shaped the
double jeopardy attachment rule are: (1) desire for a
finality ofjudgments, (2) "the minimization of harassing
exposure to the harrowing experience of a criminal trial,"
and (3) "the valued right to continue with the chosen
juy." 437 U.S. at 38.
'IdL
27id
28 "Today we explicitly hold what Somerville assumed:
the federal rule that jeopardy attaches when the jury is
empaneled and sworn is an integral part of the constitu-
tional guarantee against double jeopardy." Id. at 2162.
In Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 469 (1973), the
petitioner had argued that jeopardy attached when the
jury is sworn and empaneled. Even though a state court
was involved, the Supreme Court did not quarrel with
this assertion. Rather, it held that the double ieopardy
clause had not been violated because there had been
"manifest necessity" for a retrial.
29437 U.S. 1 (1978).
ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY
On appeal, United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit agreed with Burks' claim on the
insufficiency of the evidence and reversed on that
ground.' Rather than terminating the case against
the petitioner, the Sixth Circuit remanded the
proceeding to the district court "for a determina-
tion of whether a directed verdict of acquittal
should be entered or a new trial ordered."' The court
assumed that it had the power to order the "either/
or" remedy, since petitioner had explicitly re-
quested a new trial.32
The government did not appeal the Sixth Cir-
cuit's finding of insufficiency of evidence, so the
Supreme Court was "squarely presented with the
question of whether a defendant may be tried a
second time when a reviewing court has deter-
mined that in a prior trial the evidence was insuf-
ficient to sustain the verdict of the jury.
' ' 3
The Court held that a defendant may not be
tried a second time in this type of situation. Basi-
cally, the Court accepted the argument formulated
by the petitioner, i.e., that by deciding that the
government had failed to come forward with suf-
ficient proof of petitioner's capacity, the appellate
court was saying that petitioner's criminal culpa-
bility had not been established. "If the District
Court had so held in the first instance, as the
reviewing court said it should have done, a judg-
ment of acquittal would have been entered and, of
course, petitioner could not be retried for the same
offense." And, logically, it should not make a
30 United States v. Burks, 547 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1976).
The court based its finding on the fact that Burks had
raised a prima facie case of insanity and that the govern-
ment produced insufficient evidence of Burks' sanity.
31 Id. at 970 (emphasis added). The district court was
to choose the appropriate course "from a balancing of
the equities." The Sixth Circuit adopted the procedure
formulated in United States v. Bass, 490 F.2d 846, 852-
53 (5th Cir. 1974), as a guide to be used on remand.
"[Ulnless the government presents sufficient additional
evidence to carry its burden on the issue of defendant's
sanity," defendant would be entitled to a directed verdict
of acquittal. "If the district court ... is satisfied by the
government's presentation, it may order a new trial."
3 As authority, the court of appeals cited 28 U.S.C. §
2106 (1976) and Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552
(1950). 547 F.2d at 970.
28 U.S.C. § 2106 provides:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate
jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or
reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court
lawfully brought before it for review, and may
remand the case and direct entry of such appropri-
ate judgment, decree, or order, or require such
further proceedings as may be just under the cir-
cumstances.
33 437 U.S. at 5.
Id. at 10-11.
difference that a reviewing court rather than the
trial court determined that the evidence was insuf-
ficient. "To hold otherwise would create a purely
arbitrary distinction between those in petitioner's
position and others who would enjoy the benefit of
a correct decision by the District Court. ' ' 5
The Court recognized that the rule it was enun-
ciating in Burks was inconsistent with its prior
Bryan-Forman36 line of cases.37 Those cases stood for
the proposition that a defendant could be made'to
stand trial again after a reviewing court had re-
versed his conviction based on a lack of evidence,
if the defendant himself had requested the new
trial.-s
The failure of the Bryan-Forman line of cases to
distinguish between reversals due to trial error and
those due to insufficiency of evidence was seen by
the Burks Court as a major reason for the confusion
in this area of the law.39 The Court noted that a
reversal for trial error implies nothing with respect
to the guilt or innocence of a defendant. However,
an appellate reversal for insufficiency of evidence
means that the government's case was so inade-
quate that it should not even have been submitted
to the jury.4 As the Court stated:
Since ... [the Court] necessarily afford[s] absolute
finality to a jury's verdict of acquittal-no matter
how erroneous its decision-it is difficult to conceive
how society has any greater interest in retrying a
defendant when, on review, it is decided as a matter
of law that the jury could not properly have re-
turned a verdict of guilty.4'
Believing that the prior decisions were inconsist-
ent with the spirit and command of the double
jeopardy clause, the Supreme Court overruled
them to the extent of their inconsistency with
3
5Id at 11.
36 Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416, 425 (1960)
(Appellate reversal was based on trial error rather than
an insufficiency of evidence. The Court did not distin-
guish the two different situations; rather, it held blanketly
that "a person can be tried a second time for an offense
when his prior conviction for that same offense has been
set aside by his appeal."); Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957); Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373
(1955); Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950)
(Court of appeals reversed tax evasion conviction for
insufficiency of evidence. It remanded for a new trial.
The Supreme Court affirmed, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2106
(see note 32 supra) for authority and dismissing any double
jeopardy overtones.).







Burks.42 The Court concluded by stating that it
makes no difference that a defendant has sought a
new trial as one of his remedies (or even as his sole
remedy). If a reviewing court finds the evidence
insufficient to support a jury verdict, the only just
remedy available for that court is the direction of
a judgment of acquittal." The Court felt that it
could not be said that a person "'waives' his right
to a judgment of acquittal by moving for a new
trial.""
United States v. Scott: WHERE DEFENDANT SEEKS
AND is GRANTED DISMISSAL OF AN INDICTMENT
BEFORE A DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE
HAS BEEN MADE, THE GOVERNMENT MAY APPEAL
In United States v. Scott,' the respondent was
charged in a three-count indictment."' At the close
of all of the evidence, the trial court granted re-
spondent's motion to dismiss the first two counts
because of prejudicial preindictment delay. The'
government sought to appeal the dismissals in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit. That court, relying on United States v.Jenkins,
47
concluded that any further prosecution of defend-
ant was barred by the double jeopardy clause and
therefore the appeal had to be dismissed."Jenkins
had held that:
whether or not a dismissal of an indictment after
jeopardy had attached amounted to an acquittal on
the merits, the Government had no right to appeal,
because "further proceedings of some sort, devoted
to the resolution of factual issues going to the ele-
ments of the offense charged, would have been
required upon reversal and remand. 4 9
Clearly the Sixth Circuit was correct in applying
Jenkins to the Scott case. The respondent had been
placed in jeopardy (the jury had been empaneled
and sworn), and further proceedings would have
been needed to determine the pertinent factual
issues. The Supreme Court did not attempt to
distinguish Scott from Jenkins; rather, it noted that
42 Id. at 18.
" Id. at 17.
437 U.S. 82 (1978).
46 Respondent was charged with distribution of various
narcotics. Before his trial and twice during it, respondent
moved to dismiss two counts of the indictment. The court
granted the motion and submitted the third count to the
jury which returned a verdict of not guilty. The govern-
ment sought to appeal the dismissal of the first two
counts.
47 420 U.S. 358 (1974).
48 544 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1976).
49 437 U.S. 86 (citation omitted).
its "vastly increased exposure to the various facets
of the Double Jeopardy Clause has now convinced
... [it] that Jenkins was wrongly decided" and
should be overruledso
According to the Court, Jenkins placed an un-
warrantedly great emphasis on the defendant's
right to have his case decided by the first jury
empaneled*5 Because of this overemphasis, even a
defendant who was himself seeking to terminate a
proceeding before the issue of guilt or innocence
had been decided, on grounds unrelated to the
issue of guilt or innocence, was considered sheltered
by the double jeopardy clause.5 2 Under such cir-
cumstances, the Scott Court believed that a retrial
would not deprive a defendant of his right to go to
the first jury. In fact, the Court decided that it
would be the public which would be deprived of
its right to one complete opportunity to convict
those who have violated its laws.ss
Thus, the Court concluded that the double jeop-
ardy clause guards only against government
oppression and "does not relieve a defendant
from the consequences of his voluntary choice."' 5
The Court stressed that the respondent was neither
acquitted nor convicted, because he himself chose
to persuade the trial court not to submit the issue
of guilt or innocence to the jury.
Believing that it had pressed too far in Jenkins,
the Scott Court decided to backstep and concluded
that: "where the defendant himself seeks to have
his trial terminated without any submission to
either judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence, an
appeal by the Government from, his successful
effort to do so is not barred by 18 U.S.C. § 3751
(1976 ed.)." 56
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's latest attempts to clarify
the complexities of double jeopardy in Bretz, Burks
and Scott yields some definite guidelines: (1) it is
now clear that all states must place the attachment
ofjeopardy at the empaneling and swearing of the
jury-or earlier; (2) a defendant may not be re-
tried, even if he requests a new trial, once a review-
ing court has determined that in the prior trial the
evidence was insufficient to support the verdict;
50Id at 86-87.
51 Id. at 87.
"id. at 100.
54 Id at 99.
55Id
"6d at 101. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) provides:
... [N]o appeal shall lie where the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further
prosecution."
ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY
and (3) when the defendant himsef seeks to termi-
nate his trial before submission to the judge or jury
for a determination of guilt or innocence, the gov-
ernment is not precluded from appealing if the
defendant is successful.
Burks would seem to be the least controversial of
the three decisions.5 7 A contrary holding could lead
to a very unfair result-two identically situated
defendants might be treated differently simply be-
cause one defendant was fortuitously before a trial
judge making an error-free ruling. Once an appel-
late court has reversed a verdict because of an
insufficiency of evidence, it has ruled as a matter of
law that the defendant could not have been con-
victed."s Allowing a retrial gives the government,
which clearly failed in its initial attempt to convict
the defendant, a "second bite at the apple"-which
is exactly what the double jeopardy clause was
meant to prevent.59 There is something inherently
inequitable in penalizing a defendant for the mis-
take made by a trial judge. Fortunately, Burks
satisfactorily resolved that problem.
Separately, the holdings of Bretz and Scott are, at
the least, rationally explainable. Even read to-
gether, the concrete law produced is acceptable:
while jeopardy attaches as soon as a jury is sworn
and empaneled, a defendant upon retrial is not
placed in a second jeopardy, if he chose to termi-
57 It was an 8-0 decision by the Supreme Court.
5 See generally 437 U.S. 14-18.
59 According to the Burks Court, one of the main
reasons against permitting a second prosecution after
attachment of jeopardy is the inequality of power of the
two parties. 437 U.S. 35. The Court cited Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) as support for the
assertion that:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained
in at least the Anglo-American system of jurispru-
dence, is that the State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well
as enhancing the possibility that even though in-
nocent he may be found guilty.
nate the initial proceeding before the jury had
returned a verdict. Justice Rehnquist made a valid
argument when he said that the public has a right
to one complete opportunity to convict those who
have violated its laws.
The disturbing aspect about Bretz and Scott is
their inconsistent underlying rationales. In Bretz,
the Court held that "the valued right of a defend-
ant to continue with the chosen jury" was at the
"core" of the double jeopardy clause.60 Yet in Scott,
decided the same day as Bretz, the Court an-
nounced that the concept of a defendant's valued
right to have his trial completed by a particular
tribunal had been pressed too far.
61
Regardless of whether the Court's historical
analysis in Bretz was correct, once it had decided
that attachment of jeopardy was of constitutional
dimension, the Court should have consistently ap-
plied that reasoning to Scott. Conversely, a position
that the right to be tried by a single tribunal is not
of overriding importance would have been equally
principled-if the Court had uniformly applied
that doctrine to both Scott and Bretz.
Apparently even the Supreme Court recognizes
that its double jeopardy decisions have not always
.been internally consistent. As ChiefJustice Burger
said in Bretz: "The Court's holdings in this [double
jeopardy] area ... can hardly be characterized as
models of consistency and clarity." 2 Yet, despite
the almost evanescent quality of many double
jeopardy opinions, the Court has not totally recti-
fied the problem. Scott overruled Jenkins, a case
decided only three terms earlier. Burks overruled
the Bryan-Forman line of cases which had repre-
sented judicial thought through 1960. If the Court
is continually going to reshape the parameters of
the double jeopardy clause, it should at least try to
ensure that during each double jeopardy "period,"
every case within that period is decided based upon
a consistent rationale.
60 437 U.S. at 36.
61 437 U.S. 100-01.
62 437 U.S. 9.
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CONCEALABLE FIREARMS AND EX-FELONS
For over half a century, California has statutorily'
proscribed the possession of concealable firearms
by ex-felons.' Litigation arising under this statute,
section 12021 of the Penal Code, has involved such
issues as the status of the defendant as an ex-felon,2
or such questions as whether the weapon was truly
"concealable" within the meaning of the Act.3 It
was not until late 1978, however, that the Califor-
nia Supreme Court had to consider squarely the
issue of whether self-defense4 was a valid affirma-
tive defense to a charge of possession of a firearm
in violation of the statute. In People v. King,5 the
court said that it is permissible to raise such a
defense and thus reversed a conviction arising un-
der the statute. The trial court's refusal to instruct
the jury on self-defense as a defense to a charge of
violating section 12021 was held erroneous.
The King case provided the court with a near
perfect set of facts on which to decide the issue.
Because these facts were so essential to the court's
decision, they will be recounted in some detail
herein.
On the night of August 9, 1975, Carrie Foster
hosted a birthday party for Raymond Meggs in
San Jose, California. Attendance was by invitation
only and most of the guests were Foster's co-workers
IWhat is now Penal Code Section 12021 (a) was
originally enacted in 1923. The current version of the
statute reads, in relevant part, as follows:
Any person who has been convicted of a felony
under the laws of the United States, of the State of
California, or any other state, government, or coun-
try, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic
drug, who owns or has in his possession or under his
custody or control any pistol, revolver, or other
firearm capable of being concealed upon the person,
is guilty of a public offense....
CAL. PENAL CODE §12021 (West 1970).2 See, e.g., People v. Morrison, 67 Cal. App. 3d 425, 136
Cal. Rptr. 650 (1977); People v. Perry, 42 Cal. App. 3d
451. 116 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1974).3 See, e.g., People v. Boyd, 79 Cal. App. 2d 90, 178 P.2d
797 (1947). The issues of concealability.and status are, it
should be noted, still unsettled.'
4 For purposes of this article, defense of others and
defense of habitation will be considered under the general
rubric of "self-defense." While, strictly speaking, they are
distinct defenses, the court saw fit to consider them
together, and they will, for that reason, be so considered
here. See 21 Cal. 3d 12, 20, 582 P.2d 1000, 1004-05, 148
Cal. Rptr. 409,414.
5 22 Cal. 3d 12, 582 P.2d 1000, 148 Cal. Rptr. 409
(1978).
or students at SanJose State University. The party
was held at Ms. Foster's apartment, which was
located on the second floor of her building, and a
balcony adjoined the single entrance to the apart-
ment at the top of an outside staircase. The party
was fairly large,6 and Ms. Foster was unable to
attend to admitting all of the guests. Sometime
between 11:00 p.m. and midnight, two uninvited
persons, named Hart and Montgomery, arrived
and attempted to "crash" the party. Shortly after
their arrival, the pair became unruly,7 and, at
Hart's instigation, a fight ensued between Hart
and Meggs, the aforementioned guest of honor.
While this brouhaha was in progress on the
porch, eight more persons, friends of Hart and
Montgomery, arrived and helped create further
excitement. Meanwhile, inside the apartment, Ms.
Foster announced that the party was over and
requested the guests to leave. Most of the guests
complied. The result was that at approximately 2:
00 a.m. on the morning of August 10, 1975, the
apartment of Carrie Foster was virtually under
siege, with Ms. Foster, Andrea Armstrong, Kenny
Bolding, a disabled and wheelchair-bound Benny
Irving, five other women, and the defendant, Wil-
liam Harris King, remaining inside. Outside, the
attackers massed for another assault, and one man-
aged to force the door partially ajar. With the
assistance of Mr. Bolding, however, Ms. Foster
managed to-repel this attack, and the police were
called.
At this point, the women were especially fearful
for their safety.8 The men were also afraid, but the
defendant was still a passive observer.9 The situa-
tion, however, was becoming ever more dangerous
as the party-crashers escalated their violent at-
tempts to enter the apartment. Finally, as the
6 "As many as 30 to 40 people were present in the
apartment at times." Id. at 16, 582 P.2d at 1001, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 410.
The court stated: "They demanded condiments for
the food that they had been given, and when told that
the requested items were unavailable began ransacking
the kitchen cabinets." Id. at 16, 582 P.2d at 1002, 148
Cal. Rptr. at 411.
8 The court recounted the personal concerns of several
individual women, noting that one ran to hide in a closet,
another contemplated jumping from the second floor,
while a third collapsed in tears in a bedroom. Id. at 17,
582 P.2d at 1002, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 411.9 Id.
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attackers were "kicking and pounding" on the
door,'0
James Long, one of that group, picked up a double
hibachi grill that was on the balcony in front of the
neighboring apartment, and threw it through the
window into the dining area where defendant was
seated at a table with Benny Irving. The grill struck
defendant and showered both defendant and Irving
with glass, some particles of which lodged in de-
fendant's eyes. As soon as he managed to wash the
glass from his eyes with tears, and saw that Irving
was having difficulty attempting to flee as the
wheels of his chair were locked, defendant assisted
Irving into the bedroom in which the women had
just taken refuge. Ms. Armstrong was still attempt-
ing to obtain police assistance by telephone at that
time.'
The scene was chaotic and, for those trapped
inside the apartment, fraught with terror. As the
defendant testified, "[Pleople were screaming. The
women were crying for someone to 'do something,'
and several people were still fighting on the
porch. 1 2 It was in this context that Pam Burrell,
one of the women imprisoned inside, gave to the
defendant a .25 caliber Italian Buretta automatic
pistol. Thus armed, and still without any aid from
the police, the defendant stepped onto the porch
and fired three times into the air. Instead of dis-
persing; however, the crowd decided that the gun
was loaded with blanks and made a final charge
on the apartment. The defendant fired again, and
Montgomery, one of the original crashers, sus-
tained "a relatively minor gunshot wound."' 3 Con-
sequently, King was charged with two counts of
assault 'with a deadly weapon and one count of
illegal possession of a concealable firearm by an ex-
felon.'
4
At trial, the defendant pleaded self-defense to
the two assault charges and was acquitted.15 The
judge refused, however, to submit to the jury the
requested instructions as to self-defense on the
possession charge, and the jury returned a guilty
verdict thereon.' 6 The defendant appealed, and the
I0 1d. at 17, 582 P.2d at 1003, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
"Id. at 17-18, 582 P.2d at 1003, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
1Id. at 18, 582 P.2d at 1003, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
'
3 Id. at 18-19, 582 P.2d at 1003, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
14 See note 1, supra. The court did not indicate the
nature of King's prior felony.
' 22 Cal. 3d at 19, 582 P.2d at 1003-04, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 412-13.
6 The defense submitted two instructions on this
charge. The first read:
If you find that William Harris King acted in self-
defense, or in defense of another, then in order to
find him guilty of a violation of Section 12021 of
California Supreme Court framed the issue as fol-
lows: "[I]t is clear that if self-defense may be urged
in defense of a charge of violating section 12021,
the evidence in this case required that such instruc-
tions be given."
7
After tracing the history of section 12021, the
court considered the fact that several other statutes
conferred a right to use force, even deadly force, in
self-defense.1 8 These provisions do not distinguish
felons and other classes of persons, and the court
"presumed" that the legislature was aware of them
while enacting section 12021.19 The court stated,
moreover, that although section 12021 is explicit
in its terms, it "does not expressly conflict with any
of these provisions and thus does not demonstrate
a legislative intent to supersede or repeal them with
respect to a felon's right to self-defense." ''
Furthermore, the court noted, section 12021 is
not a blanket prohibition against possession of
, firearms by felons, but rather it is by its terms
limited to concealable firearms. "Thus," said the
court,
we cannot infer that the Legislature intended ab-
solutely to deny felons the rights declared in sections
692, 693, 694, and 197 and in Civil Code section 50.
In construing section 12021, therefore, we mnust
reconcile its prohibition of possession of a conceal-
able firearm with those statutes declaring the right
of any person to use even deadly force in self-
defense.
2 1
the Penal Code (possession of a concealable firearm
by a felon) you must find that he had possession,
custody or control of such firearm prior to the
transaction or occurrence in which he acted in self-
defense.
Id at 20 n.4, 582 P.2d at 1004 n.4, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 413
n.4. The second read:
If a person, as a reasonable man, has grounds for
believing and does believe that he is about to suffer
bodily harms [sic], and he grabs a weapon to defend
himself, and uses this weapon only as would appear
necessary to a reasonable person to prevent injury
which appears to be imminent, then his person is
not guilty of being a felon in possession of a con-
cealed [sic] weapon as prohibited by Penal Code
Section 12021.
Id. at n.5, 582 P.2d at 1004 n.5, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 413
n.5.
17 Id. at 20, 582 P.2d at 1004, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
18 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 692-94 (West 1970) and
CiviL CODE § 50 (West 1954). These provisions basically
authorize the use of force to defend against the commis-
sion of a "public offense" or injury to oneself, family or
habitation.
19 22 Cal. 3d at 22, 582 P.2d at 1005, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
414.




Because felons are not denied the right to use
deadly force in appropriate circumstances, the
court was forced to infer the basis for the legislative
distinction between concealable firearms and other
weapons or means of violence. Without substantial
analysis, the court determined that the legislature
believed that these firearms should not be "readily
available lest the weapons be used for crimes of
violence or other purposes. ' 2
Since the mere possession and use of a conceal-
able firearm is not in itself unlawful, and since the
State conceded that felons may lawfully possess
and use nonconcealable weapons in self-defense,s2
the court held that the purposes of the statute
would not be furthered by denying felons the right
to use such weapons in situations which would
otherwise give rise the need for self-defense. Indeed,
the court reasoned,
It would be unreasonable and would lead to absurd
results to construe section 12021 as permitting the
use of a shotgun, but proscribing the use of a small
caliber pistol in self-defense, and thus forcing the
felon to use only a weapon capable of inflicting
greater injury if he is forced by circumstances to use
deadly force in self-defense.... Thus, when a [felon]
is in imminent peril of great bodily harm or reason-
ably believes himself or others to be in such danger,
and without preconceived design on his part a
firearm is made available to him, has temporary
possession of that weapon for a period no longer
than that in which the necessity or apparent neces-
sity to use it in self-defense continues, does not
violate section 12021.2
It is important to note that the court carefully
worded its holding so that the legislative distinction
between non-concealable firearms and concealable
firearms is preserved. The court merely held that
in a situation which allows for the use of deadly
force in self-defense, a felon may, for the minimum
necessary amount of time, possess a concealable
firearm for the purpose of self-defense, provided that
his possession is not by "preconceived design."
Of crucial importance to the court's opinion was
the premise that section 12021 was not enacted to
preclude felons from possessing firearms. Rather,
the section demonstrated a legislative belief that
2 Id. The court did, however, cite two appellate court
cases, People v. Booker, 77 Cal. App. 3d 223, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 482 (1978), and People v. Dubose, 41 Cal. App. 3d
847, 117 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1974), which tended to support
its osition.
22 Cal. 3d at 24, 582 P.2d at 1006-07, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 415-16.
24 Id. at 24, 582 P.2d at 1007, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
the possession of concealable firearms by felons
would be likely to provide opportunities for vio-
lence by those whose bad judgment has been
proved. By drafting the holding in such a way that
a felon who conspires to gain possession of a con-
cealable weapon prior to any necessity for its use
for self-defense is not excused from section 12021,
the purposes of the provision have not been under-
mined.
The court found support for this reasoning by
referring to its earlier holding in People v. Satchell."
There, where the defendant had admitted to four
prior felony convictions, the charge was second
degree felony murder arising out of the defendant's
unpremeditated slaying of the victim with a sawed-
off shotgun. The underlying felony for the felony
murder charge was the violation of section 12021.
After the trial court had convicted the defendant
in accordance with section 12021, the California
Supreme Court reversed the conviction on appeal.
In its reversal, the court claimed that the purpose
of felony-murder is to provide a separate category
of crime for inherently dangerous acts resulting in
death. However, the court held that the possession
of a concealable firearm by a felon, in violation of
section 12021, was not inherently dangerous.2
6
Despite the existence of the Satchell precedent,
the State in King argued that the issue presented in
that case had been settled in favor of the state as
recently as 1974 in People v. Evans.27 In the Evans
case, the defendant, a trainee dispatcher for the
Yellow Cab Company, took a call for a taxi and
gave it to one driver rather than the driver next in
line, because the latter was asleep. When the sleep-
ing driver awoke, the defendant dispatcher called
him a "lazy bastard" and said, "I'll beat your ass,
punk.' 's8 The tired driver, apparently unaccus-
tomed to such verbal abuse, approached the de-
fendant in a threatening manner, prompting the
defendant, an ex-felon, to retrieve a pistol from a
desk drawer and shoot the driver in the cheek.
Rejecting a plea of self-defense, the court of appeals
held that "[a]n ex-felon's right to defend himself
remains, but he is prevented from the use of fire-
arms." In King, however, the California Supreme
Court referred to that statement as mere dictum,
because the defendant in Evans, unlike the defend-
ant in King, had armed himself prior to the shooting
2 6 Cal. 3d 28, 489 P.2d 1361, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1971).
26Id at 40, 489 P.2d at 1369, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
27 40 Cal. App. 3d 582, 115 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1974).
2 Id at 584, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
2 Id at 587, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
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incident. As the King court noted, "To the extent
that dictum in Evans suggests that a felon may not
in any circumstances use firearms in exercising his
right to self-defense, it is disapproved." °
Justice Clark, dissenting in King,31 disagreed with
the majority's reasoning and focused on the fact
that the legislature did not provide an exception to
section 12021 for self-defense.Justice Clark inferred
that this failure to provide a self-defense exception
indicated a legislative judgment not to recognize
one. Clark believed that felons cannot be expected
"to exercise sound judgment and self-restraint in
the necessarily explosive situations giving rise to
the right of self-defense."3 2 Furthermore, said
Clark, the majority's ruling will encourage felons
to "abuse" the self-defense right and to have "ready
access" to concealable weapons "in anticipation of
their use."
33
3o 22 Cal. 3d at 25, 582 P.2d at 1008, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
417.
a1 Id. at 27, 582 P.2d at 1009, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
32 Id. at 28, 582 P.2d at 1009, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
33 id.
Both of these observations by Justice Clark, how-
ever, are flatly contradicted by the court's holding.
The "sound judgment" question is a question of
fact for the jury, and if a felon designs to have
"ready access" to a concealable weapon for pur-
poses of self-defense, the defense would not be
available to him under the terms of King.
Thus, the California Supreme Court in King has
recognized that it makes little sense to allow felons
to possess non-concealable weapons and to use such
weapons in self-defense, while prohibiting the pos-
session and use of smaller, and presumably less
lethal, concealable weapons under identical cir-
cumstances. In arriving at its decision, the court
not only gave a practical reading to the language
of section 12021, but the standards created also
gave broad deference to juries in making their
factual determinations. Whether a person was in
fact in imminent danger or had armed himself
prior to the immediate necessity of using the
weapon will be a question for juries to decide. It
should not be any more difficult than other matters
routinely submitted to a jury.
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